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Abstract
This paper develops a quantitative model of unsecured debt, default, and money
demand for heterogenous agents economies. The paper generates a theory of money
demand for the case in which money is a dominate asset that is not needed to carry-out
transactions. In this environment holding money helps the agents to smooth their
consumption during those periods in which they are excluded from credit markets
following a default in their debts. In the model the welfare of the individuals is
a®ected by the in°ation rate: high in°ation rates preclude individuals of using money
as an asset that helps them smooth their consumption pro¯le but low in°ation rates
tend to make softer the punishment for default making it di±cult to sustain high
levels of debt at equilibrium. This two opposite e®ects imply that in equilibrium the
in°ation rate that maximizes individuals welfare is positive but not too high.
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We extend the Aiyagari (1994) model of heterogeneous agents that face idiosyn-
cratic earnings shocks and incomplete credit markets by introducing bankruptcy, and
unbacked money that cannot be liquidated to pay o® unsecured debts. These ex-
tensions allow us to show: ¯rst, in equilibrium agents hold a part of their wealth in
the form of money balances, second, the existence of a second asset which is exempt
from liquidation increases the probability of bankruptcy, and third, as in Zame (1993)
"voluntary" default improves the e±ciency of equilibrium allocations.
The model in this paper is closely related to the literature on unsecured debt and
consumer bankruptcy (see for example Chatterjee et al. (2005,2006), Livshits (2003,
2007), etc.). It departs from this literature by focusing on how the equilibrium of the
model with bankruptcy is modi¯ed when an additional asset in which the individuals
can store their wealth is introduced to the model. Also, in the model the emphasis
is on "voluntary" bankruptcy vs. "involuntary" bankruptcy, and as a consequence,
consumer bankruptcy acts in this framework as a way to complete credit markets,
favoring consumption smoothing by individuals in the economy. The possibility of
¯lling for bankruptcy reduces the level of precautionary savings that the agents require
in order to smooth consumption when they face uncertain individual earnings.
The paper is also related to the literature on the role of incomplete markets in
supporting a demand for unbacked money at equilibrium (see for example, Bewley
(1977,1980,1983,1986)). The main departure of the model from this literature is
that in here credit access is endogenous rather than exogenous, and therefore the
demand for money that arises does not depend on ad-hoc exogenous credit constraints.
Credit constraints are endogenous and because these constraints are a function of the
individuals' earnings, they di®er across individuals. Additionally the credit market is
not open to all individuals. Only those individuals that are not in a default state have
access to the market. As a consequence we observed an endogenous segmentation of
the credit markets.
In our model economy ¯lling for bankruptcy is an optimal choice that allows
households to improve the e±ciency of the non-contingent contracts by reducing
the size of the precautionary savings they need to protect themselves against the
possibility of a stream of negative earning shocks. However, bankruptcy entitles a
cost: a defaulting individual is excluded from credit markets during a random number
1of periods. In this environment, money can be used as an alternative asset that helps
to smooth consumption during the periods in which the agents are out of the credit
markets. In such way we obtain a theory of the existence of money even when money
is an asset that is not needed to carry-out transactions in the economy, and that does
not generate a positive return.
Therefore, as in the models of Bewley (1986, undated) the demand of money at
equilibrium is a function of the degree of market incompleteness of the credit markets.
But, as we said before, the main di®erence of this article with those previous studies
is that in the context of this model the degree of market incompleteness is to some
extent endogenous. Individuals'decision of declaring bankruptcy and therefore to be
excluded from the credit markets for a random number of periods is endogenous.
Also, the probability that an individual will ¯ll for bankruptcy in the next period will
determined the credit limits that this particular individual faces.
In economies where the cost of going into default tends to in¯nite there are not
tighter limits to borrowing than the natural limit of debt de¯ned by Aiyagari (1994).
In those economies, given the observed negative return in money balances (that cor-
responds to the in°ation rate), the equilibrium money demand is zero. In such case
the optimal level of in°ation is undetermined.
In economies where it is possible to declare bankruptcy tighter borrowing limits
arise and the welfare of the agents in this economy depends on the in°ation rate: high
levels of in°ation preclude the agents from using money as a way to achieve a smoother
path for consumption; however, low in°ation rates make the cost of bankruptcy rela-
tively low, and as a consequence, it is harder to support high levels of unsecured debt
at equilibrium.
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we describe a the model with
unsecured debt and un-backed money. Section 3 presents the numerical ¯ndings. In
the last section we conclude.
2 The Model
We extend the Aiyagari (1994) model of heterogeneous agents that face idiosyn-
cratic earnings shocks and incomplete credit markets by introducing "voluntary" de-
2fault risk and unbacked money that can not be liquidated to pay o® unsecured debts.
Technology
There is one good produced by a constant return production function, F(Kt;Lt) where
Kt is the aggregate capital stock that depreciates at rate ± and Nt is the aggregate
labor in e±ciency units. There is no aggregate uncertainty.
Households
The model economy is populated by a continuum of in¯nitely live households that






where ct is the household consumption and ¯t 2 (0;1) is the discount rate and u(:)
is continuously di®erentiable, strictly concave, and monotonically increasing. Each
household is endowed with one unit of time, and each period they receive an idiosyn-
cratic labor e±ciency shock, et 2 [e;e] ½ R++, that follows a discrete Markov process,
º(et;et+1).
Markets are incomplete and in order to smooth consumption agents can save or
borrow using non-contingent one-period unsecured bonds, bt 2 [b;b] ½ R, or storing
wealth in un-backed money balances, mt 2 [m;m] ½ R+.
Households have the option to declare bankruptcy. If a household ¯les for bankruptcy
its debts are discharged and its level of unsecured debt is set to zero, bt = 0. During
a stochastic number of periods ¯lers face two types of punishments: ¯rst, they will be
excluded of the credit market, and second, they will experience a loss equal to a frac-
tion µ of their labor earnings. The current period consumption of these households is
given by the following budget constraint:
c
d(e;m;m





where w is the real wage per e±ciency unit, ¼ is the in°ation rate, and t ia a lump-
sum transfer from the government to the households. Note that the unbacked money
balances, m, can not be liquidated to pay o® unsecured debts. Then, total resources
that are exempt from liquidation in the case of bankruptcy are equal to (1 ¡µ)wet +
3m
1+¼. One key di®erence between (1¡µ)wet and m
1+¼ is that the ¯rst type of resources
at the disposition of bankrupted households is beyond the control of these households,
while the second type of resources is under the control of these households. In other
words, households choose how much of their wealth they hold in the form of monetary
balances.
If a household has access to the credit market and the household does not ¯ll for











where q is the price bond.
The optimization problem of a household is de¯ned recursively using two distinct
value functions. V d is the value of being excluded from the credit market, while W is
the value of not being excluded from the credit market. Consider a household with a
















where (1 ¡ ¹) is the probability of coming back to the credit market in the next
period and start with an level of unsecured debt b = 0. Then, the value of not being


































There is a continuum with measure one of identical, in¯nitely lived bankers. The
individual banker is risk neutral. Bankers have complete information about house-
holds. They observe the total level of borrowing bt+1, the current persistent labor
e±ciency shock et, and the borrower's money balances, mt. This information allows
the bankers to forecast the default probability of each individual, d(et;mt;bt+1), and
price each bond q(et;bt;mt;bt+1) according to their zero pro¯t condition.
4Government
There is a government, which is benevolent in the sense that its objective is to maxi-






where Tt is the aggregate lump-sum transfer.
2.1 Characterization of the demand for unbacked money
In our model economy, if a household defaults, this household demands unbacked














Given that these type of households are not allowed to access the credit market
@V d(e;m)
@m is, as in an Bewley economy, strictly positive. If a household does not default,
this household demands unbacked money, m0, and the unsecured bond, b0, in a way































































The ¯st part of equation (1) says that increasing money holdings always give 1
1+¼
units of good tomorrow. The second part says that, conditional on not defaulting,
we pay a lower bond prize tomorrow, given that q(e;b;m;b0) is not increasing in
money (see ¯gure 1). Equation (2) says that the opportunity cost of increasing money



























Figure 1: Price of bonds is increasing in money holdings.
if the household ¯nds optimal to default with probability d(e0;b0;m0;b0) 2 (0;1), the


































An steady-sate competitive equilibrium is a set of strictly positive prices, w¤, ^ q, a non
negative loan price vector q(e;b;m;b0) and in°ation rate ¼¤, strictly positive quantities
of aggregate labor,N¤, and capital, K¤, value functions W(e;b;m), V d(e;m), policy
functions m0 = gm(e;b;m), b0 = gb(e;b;m), m0 = gd
m(e;m), d(e;b;m) and a measure
'(e;b;m) such that the following conditions hold:
1. Consumer's optimization. Given the in°ation rate, ¼¤, and the price q(e;b;m;b0),
the functions W(e;b;m), V d(e;m)solves consumers's problem. m0 = gm(e;b;m),
b0 = gb(e;b;m), m0 = gd
m(e;m) and d(e;b;m) are optimal policy functions.
































Figure 2: Value function is increasing in money holdings.
3. K¤ and N¤ solves the ¯rm problem






















6. The stationary distribution '(e;b;m) is induced by exogenous º(e;e0) and gm(e;b;m),
gb(e;b;m), gd

























Value Risk Aversion 2.75
Capital share 0.025
Productivity parameter 0.25
Autocorrelation of individuals labor income 0.7294
Volatility of individuals labor income s 0.0684
Discount Factor 0.955
Probability of reentering credit markets 0.5
Parameter of punishment 0.75
3 Findings
Our benchmark economy is an economy like the one in Aiyagari (1994): an economy
populated by heterogenous agents that face idiosyncratic uncertainty in their labor
earnings and that have access to a credit market where one-period non-contingent
bonds are traded. The only credit limit that applies to the individuals in this economy
is the "natural debt limit".
We compared the previous economy to two di®erent economies: First, a economy
like the benchmark economy but where individuals are allowed to ¯ll for bankruptcy,
and second, an economy where individuals are allowed to ¯ll for bankruptcy and
where they can use money balances to store their wealth.
The numerical simulation of these economies assumes that one period in the model
is the equivalent to a time period of a quarter. A summary of the parameters' values
used in the simulation is presented in Table 1.
Table 2 summarizes our numerical ¯ndings. We summarize the results of these
experiments as follows:
1. First, allowing a household to ¯ll for bankruptcy decreases the level of precau-
tionary savings,
2. Second, allowing a household to maintain a part of their wealth in the form of
money balances increases the equilibrium probability of declaring bankruptcy
by a factor of 10.
8Table 2: Numerical experiment
Variables Baseline Bankruptcy No Money Bankruptcy Money
Credit Limits/GDP 1147.00% 79.11% 79.01%
Interest Rate 4.444% 4.508% 4.512%
Probability of Default 0.000 0.024% 0.299%
Mean Risk Premium 0.000 0.054% 0.441%
Money Demand/GDP 0.000 0.000 3.587e-4
Savings/GDP 10.81% 10.70% 10.69%
It is worth discussing how unbacked money a®ects the decision to go into bankruptcy.
In our model economy going into bankruptcy is always an optimal choice, because














is never empty, because the maximum level of debt is required to be grater than the
natural debt limit
min(B) ¸ ¡Á = ¡we^ q
where ^ q is the risk-free price bond. Households choose to default if the present ben-
e¯ts of going into default are higher than the future cost of being excluded from the
credit market. The future cost of ¯lling for bankruptcy is the inability to smooth
consumption during a stochastic number of periods. Allowing households to accu-
mulated unbacked money balances increases the present bene¯ts of defaulting and
reduces the future costs of ¯lling for bankruptcy.
Allowing households to use money balances to store wealth increases the present
bene¯ts of going into default by giving bankrupted households some control over
the fraction of their resources that are exempt of liquidation. Additionally, holding
money balances reduces the future cost of bankruptcy by allowing bankrupted house-
holds that have lost access to credit markets to have a level of consumption that
di®ers from their labor earnings and that can be made less volatile than this income.
Then allowing households to accumulated unbacked money balances must increase
the equilibrium probability of default.
Moreover, as the probability of default increases the endogenous credit limits
become tighter for the economy as a whole. In other words, the maximum level
9of debt that can be supported at equilibrium is lower the higher is the equilibrium
probability of default. In the standard Aiyagari model tighter credit limits induce
higher precautionary savings. However in our model economy tighter endogenous
credit limits also generated more bankruptcy in equilibria. In a world of uncertainty
and incomplete markets the possibility of default allows households to improve the
e±ciency of the non-contingent contracts by reducing the size of the precautionary
savings they need in order to protect themselves against a stream of negative earnings
shocks. Moreover, tighter credit limits expand the equilibrium amount of unbacked
money that is hold by the households generating conditions to support money with
a ¯nite positive price level.1
4 Conclusions
We show that bankruptcy helps to complete the credit market by reducing the size
of precautionary savings in the economy. Moreover, including money in models of
unsecured debt helps to explain a much higher probability of default at equilibrium.
Our ¯ndings have several implications. First, we show that it is not always rea-
sonable to think that in models with heterogeneous agents a closed economy with
more enforcement problems in its credit market should have a higher savings rate,
and higher investment levels than countries in which credit markets work better.
We ¯nd that countries with more enforcement problems where agents are able to go
into bankruptcy and choose to do so "voluntarily" should save and invest less than
countries with less enforcement problems.
Second, di®erent levels of in°ation modify the incentives that individuals have
to go into bankruptcy. The in°ation rate has to opposite e®ects on the welfare of
the individuals in the economy: In one hand, with high in°ation rates holding money
balances is very costly, and this asset does not help too much the individuals to smooth
their consumption. In the other hand, high in°ation rates make the punishment for
default harsher, and allows the economy to support larger levels of debt at equilibrium.
Analyzing numerically these opposite forces will allow us to determine an optimal level
of in°ation.
1In the limit, as the credit limits tends to zero the economy converge to a Bewley economy.
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